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There is an intellectual problem associated with the shared understanding of Catholics since the Second 
Vatican Council that the secular domain has its own autonomy and that certain forms of faith-based 
intervention are inappropriate. For instance, we agree that it is mistaken to intervene in political debate 
or in economic policy-making by appealing only or primarily to ‘The Will of God’, or by grounding our 
proposals exclusively in ‘The Teaching of the Church’. The problem arises because at the same time we 
confidently affirm in faith that there is no dimension of our human existence which is immune from 
religion or God’s grace. Our faith commitment, we say, should animate and inspire our whole lives, 
including our economic, social and political existence. Our faith should animate our politics, and make its 
impact there. Hence the question: while in practice it might be possible to live with the tension – and it 
would be very useful to gather the experience of believing women and men in public life – is there not 
an intellectual incoherence in holding both positions at the same time? How can we integrate the views 
that ‘faith should influence politics’, and ‘the secular domain of the political should be autonomous, i.e. 
free from religious influence’?  
The question arises at present from a variety of sources. It is not only a problem for Catholic Christians. 
We expect of the adherents of other religions that they also exercise restraint in the manner in which 
they contribute to political debate. But from within their own worldviews they must experience a similar 
tension. For instance, Muslim voices remind all people of faith that the will of God is sovereign, and that 
no dimension of creaturely existence can be hidden from His demands. Pope Francis in Laudato Si’ 
engages in a vigorous way in contemporary scientific and political debates and calls on Christians and all 
people of good will to make their voices heard. Some object that this is unwarranted interference by 
religion in the secular, while others applaud the vision which sees religion as relevant to every day and 
not only Sunday (or Saturday or Friday). There is a need to revisit this question and articulate a 
theological as well as philosophical answer which takes seriously and sympathetically both views. 
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This question has several presuppositions and it may be useful at this point to articulate them so that 
possible misunderstandings are avoided. Needless to say the question cannot arise for anyone who 
accepts what William Cavanaugh calls ‘The Myth of Religious Violence’, namely, the belief that violence 
arises from religious differences and that the secular state is the solution to what is an inherently 
religious problem (Cavanaugh 2009). Cavanaugh’s arguments in exploding the myth will not be repeated 
here, but the question will be addressed on the assumption that an intellectual problem remains for all 
people of faith who wish to remain faithful and yet support a shared secular political order. In other 
words, this discussion is not primarily addressed to secularists who seek ways of controlling the 
destructive forces of religion, nor is it primarily addressed to religious enthusiasts who strive to capture 
state power by whatever means so as to implement their vision of a divinely willed regime. Such 
audiences and their concerns deserve attention, but it is not given here. There are many contemporary 
discussions of religious conflict but this paper does not engage in any of them. Instead it is addressed to 
people of religious faith who experience a conflict within themselves, who ask how it is possible that 
they remain faithful to their own religious tradition and yet endorse the claims of a secular political 
order. It is therefore another assumption of this discussion that they will have good non-religious 
reasons persuading them to accept the justifiability of a secular state. The question then is about the 
possible coherence of their religious and non-religious reasons, despite their apparent incoherence.  
The question is an old one. Augustine in The City of God (Bk IV chapter 4) identified the problem and 
gave it its classical formulation. He narrated the story of the pirate who had been arrested by 
Alexander’s forces and brought before the emperor. Challenged to explain what he was up to by 
engaging in piracy on the waters of the eastern Mediterranean which Alexander dominated, the pirate 
answered that he was doing nothing different from what the emperor himself was doing. The only 
difference was one of scale. The pirate pursued a life of robbery and pillage on a single small ship, and 
they called him a pirate, while Alexander pursued the same goals of conquest and theft with a vast fleet 
and a big army, and was called commander and emperor. Augustine reflects on this story and asks if 
there is really any difference between the two. Isn’t political power the same as organized crime except 
on the largest scale? Isn’t it simply domination and exploitation which can succeed because there is no 
higher power to control it? 
There seems to be something very modern about this fifth century question. It seems to contain a 
familiar form of anti-establishment critique, which is suspicious at every point of state authority and its 
claims to obedience (Chomsky 2002). But Augustine’s answer doesn’t evoke the same echo. He agrees 
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that there is no difference in principle between organized crime and political power unless the latter is 
characterized by justice. ‘In the absence of justice, what is power but organized crime?’ To explain what 
he means by justice Augustine draws on the Roman law traditions which saw it as the constant 
inclination to give each one his due. This is the familiar definition from Justinian developed later by the 
scholastics especially Aquinas. But Augustine makes a daring move at this point. A city which failed to 
give God what is due to God could not claim to be just. And what is due to God is submission, 
obedience, and conformity to His will and purpose. What is due to God alongside obedience to his will is 
worship, shown in the offering of sacrifices and the prayers of praise and petition. A political power 
which saw itself as sovereign, i.e. as the highest authority, without the need to submit to the authority 
of God, could not be just, since failing to give each his due, and so would be no different from organized 
crime.  
We have to acknowledge the relevance of Augustine’s answer for our contemporary situation. How can 
a modern secular state deserve respect and obedience if its claim to these is solely based on its ability to 
coerce its subjects with the threat of punishment? And if its claim to obedience is based on its success in 
delivering benefits to its people, how far can such authority extend? As Alasdair MacIntyre puts it, how 
can a modern state which claims for itself no other grounding than the provision of services and security 
ask people to make sacrifices and even die (or kill) on its behalf? It is like being asked to die for the 
telephone company! (MacIntyre 1994, 303). 
Let me repeat the dilemma formulated at the beginning. I do not want to take the simple implication of 
the story so far, that the state to deserve respect must give God worship and service and implement His 
will. I acknowledge the force of this argument, but at the same time I don’t want to be a citizen of a 
republic or a subject of a monarch which imposes a religious discipline on me or on my society (we have 
had that in Ireland in the centuries following the reformation. Some would say we have had it also in the 
decades following independence when the Catholic Church was particularly influential in the ethos of 
the country). I see the value of liberal democracy and the self-restricting principles of constitutionalism, 
and I want to uphold these. The challenge is to articulate an understanding of my position which is 
respectful of both poles, the theological as well as the political. 
 
II 
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In an earlier publication on this topic I surveyed the different models used to accommodate both 
concerns (Riordan 2008). Since I am both religiously observant and politically committed, and there are 
appropriate ways of speaking about both religion and politics, the question is how the two can be 
integrated in one single perspective. There can be no solution in a perspective which denies the validity 
of one or the other. Both religion and politics must be respected. The familiar poles of Theocracy and 
Civil Religion have in common the tendency to subject one dimension completely to the other (Beiner 
2011). Theocracy makes the political subordinate to the religious such that law-making and social policy 
are driven primarily by the requirements of the revealed will of God. Civil religion on the other hand, 
recognizes the important social contribution of religion in fostering social cohesion and civil virtues and 
so harnesses the religious dimension to serve the interests of the political. Neither pole can be 
acceptable if we wish to retain respect for the validity of each dimension (Riordan 2015). We need a 
model which respects both, in their essence and their difference, but allows a way of speaking of both in 
a unified way. I suggest that five such models are familiar. 
1. Private – public 
2. Augustine: Ultimate peace and justice – temporal peace and justice 
3. Aquinas: Common good – public order 
4. Civil society – state 
5. Rawls: Reasonable comprehensive doctrines – overlapping consensus 
For simplicity sake I associate the first term in each case with religion and the second with the political. 
Three of these are linked with named thinkers while two are more generally espoused. In that earlier 
discussion I favoured Aquinas’s model of common good and public order; however, in this paper I will 
return to Augustine’s model. I will argue that there is a valuable theological point which may be lost in 
the adoption of the more philosophical language of common goods. In the following I will briefly outline 
the five models with their advantages and disadvantages. Then I will consider Augustine’s argument at 
greater depth.  
1. Private – public  
The ‘private – public’ model describes the realm of the political as the public arena, and relies on 
philosophical attempts to articulate what can be presupposed as shared in the public arena. Depending 
on the account offered, standards of argumentation for the public sphere are laid down (Audi 2000). 
Participants in the public forum are required to conform to these standards. The diversity of ultimate 
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commitments makes it necessary to secure a public domain in which people can be free from the threat 
of oppression in the name of another’s religion. The price for this freedom and security is that they must 
forego the possibility of using the public power to impose their own religious convictions or practices on 
others. 
This distinction allows a legitimacy and validity to religion, by confining it to a realm apart from that of 
the public. The disadvantage of this confinement is that religion is deprived of some dimensions of its 
self-understanding, insofar as it considers itself to have a public role. Nonetheless, many religious 
people have found it a useful compromise since it secures for them a space in which to hold their beliefs 
and practice their religion without interference from others or from the state. It should be noted also 
that the public domain is disadvantaged to the extent that it is deprived of some resources for dealing 
with relevant problems when it excludes the religious from the life of the public square. 
2. Augustine: Ultimate peace and justice – temporal peace and justice  
Augustine’s conceptualization of the relationship between religion and politics is particularly privileged, 
because he could be said to stand in both camps. As a scholar in the Roman cultural world, he had a 
deep appreciation of the history and ethos of the political (TeSelle 1987). As a bishop of the Christian 
Church, he had a sound theological appreciation of created reality within the divine economy. Augustine 
worked out his position in response to the allegation that Christianity had destroyed the proper balance 
between religion and politics (Markus 1970). Pagan refugees from Rome maintained that Rome’s defeat 
was due to the city’s abandonment of its traditional religious practices. Rome’s divine patrons had 
supposedly withdrawn their favour and protection because the city had transferred its worship to the 
God of the Christians. Augustine’s argument in the collection of books known as The City of God hinges 
on a contrast between two communities, the City of God and the earthly city. The contrast is drawn in 
terms of the motivating goods and the typical psychological states of the members of both communities. 
Love of God is contrasted with love of self, the desire to serve and obey is contrasted with the desire to 
dominate, the pursuit of God’s glory is contrasted with the pursuit of fame and honour, the harmony of 
peace and justice is contrasted with the constant battling for domination among nations and within 
nations. These two cities are in conflict with one another, but it is a conflict of a different order to that 
found within the earthly city. The battle lines are drawn through the hearts of men and women as well 
as through societies and states. The victory is assured, the Bishop Augustine affirms, but beyond history. 
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Within history, in this age (saeculum, the origin of our word ‘secular’), the human political community is 
not identical with the earthly city, but is a complex of the dynamics of both cities (Markus 1970, 58). Far 
from denying the goodness of the historical community, Augustine acknowledges that it pursues 
temporal peace and justice, which provide the conditions in which people can pursue their calling to 
love their neighbour and to serve God. The flaw in temporal peace and justice is that it must inevitably 
rely on domination, on coercion. The assertion of human will is at the core of Augustine’s understanding 
of sin, and the rebellion of human will against the divine will is the ultimate source of the disorder he 
analyses. But for order to be maintained in the political community, there must be a dimension of 
domination.  
3. Aquinas: Common good – public order 
Aquinas distinguished between a limited good as the proper object of political order and the 
unrestricted common good as the ultimate object of human striving (Finnis 1998). The questions which 
arise require investigation into the relationship between temporal goods of justice and peace, and the 
unrestricted goods of beatitude. If that relationship is one of subordination, or instrumentality, does it 
follow that there is an obligation to apply the means appropriate to the inferior good so that they also 
bring about the higher good? In other words, should the political regime use the coercive instruments of 
human law to ensure that its people obey God and do his will? 
Aquinas deals with this question by means of parallel distinctions, first between different levels of good, 
and second between divine and human law. His definition of law as an ordinance of reason directed to 
the common good, made by one who has responsibility for the community, and promulgated (S.th. 
1a2ae q90 a4), leaves open the possibility that there are different goods in common for different 
communities. It also leaves open the possibility that the methods to be employed in the application of 
law are different. The law of a political community is for the good of that community, and so it prohibits 
actions which threaten the peace and stability of the community. Divine law is for a different and higher 
good, and so requires an interior submission as well as outward conformity. ‘And so what suffices for 
the perfection of human law, viz., that it prohibit wrongdoing and impose punishments, does not suffice 
for the perfection of divine law; what that needs is that one be made completely ready for participation 
in eternal fulfilment’ (S.th. 1a2ae q98 a1c, quoted by Finnis 1998, 177). In contrast to divine law which 
has eternal beatitude as its purpose and expects the interior submission of subjects, human law is for 
the sake of social peace, and is satisfied by outward conformity.  
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For Alasdair MacIntyre the context of these reflections are the policies adopted by King Louis IX of 
France, and the Emperor, Frederick II in the Kingdom of Sicily. Aquinas encountered Louis’ rule in Paris, 
that of the emperor Frederick while a young student at Naples. Louis IX understood his royal authority in 
theological terms, considering it his duty to enforce the moral and religious teachings of Scripture and 
the Church. Against his use of law as an instrument of moral education, Aquinas argued that human law 
should not attempt to repress all the vices, or indeed to enforce all the virtues. Where Louis appeals to 
Christian theological sources, Aquinas argues from human reason, generating standards which should 
apply to all rulers, whether Christian or not. It is not necessary for valid human law that it be made by a 
Christian prince using Christian principles. It is necessary that it be reasonable, and recognizable as such 
by rational citizens. Similarly, Aquinas’s difference with Frederick was based on the emperor’s view of 
his authority to make law. The emperor claimed a divine source for his authority, as the providential 
instrument to correct the weaknesses of fallen humankind, presenting himself as the only source of 
peace and justice (MacIntyre 1996, 73). 
This third model for conceptualizing the relationship between religion and politics draws on Aquinas’s 
parallel distinctions between divine (moral) law and human law, and between the unrestricted common 
good of God’s kingdom and the restricted common good of any political community. In his use of these 
distinctions, he denies that the restricted is simply instrumental to the unrestricted, so that he explicitly 
rules out the use of the instruments appropriate to human law (e.g. coercion) so as to ensure the 
achievement of the goods corresponding to divine law (e.g. salvation). 
4. Civil society – state 
The revival of interest in the notion of civil society provides a new context for considering the place of 
religion within the polity. Two major developments have precipitated the renewed interest in the topic 
of civil society, the collapse of the Soviet bloc, and the process of globalization. In presenting this model 
I rely on the usage of the term in the literature of the social sciences, in which civil society, the state, and 
the market are seen as three domains alongside and intertwined with one another, but without any 
priority among them. With the new visibility of religion in the public space Churches and religious bodies 
are spoken of as belonging to civil society, as the realm of socially organized activity and participation 
(Casanova 1994, 71). Among the valued contributions of civil society on this view is the creation and 
maintenance of social capital. The literature recognises the contribution of the Churches in some 
societies in fostering the constituent elements of democratic culture, in facilitating the formation and 
education of citizens to engage in argument and to accept conciliation in conflict. Religion is 
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acknowledged to contribute to the development of civil society in providing an institutional space, a 
wealth of symbols, metaphors and stories, an international dimension, and an intellectual heritage 
(Herbert 2003, 70). This very positive evaluation of the role of religion in fostering the social capital 
which is essential for liberal democratic politics makes this model particularly useful for the citizen who 
is at the same time a believer and seeks ways of integrating the two aspects of life. In the global context, 
the model also offers particular advantages, especially as the major faiths have world-wide distribution, 
and so find a ready-made category for the collaboration of churches and faith groups in the 
international forum. 
5. Rawls: Reasonable comprehensive doctrines – overlapping consensus 
The fifth model is taken from the late writings of political philosopher John Rawls. There has been a 
significant development in his understanding of the relationship between religion and politics. This is 
clear from an article entitled ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ (1997) in which he reworked the 
position as presented earlier in Political Liberalism (1996). In dealing with the question of religion and 
politics in Political Liberalism, Rawls imagines several reasonable comprehensive doctrines, including 
religious ones, coexisting in a liberal, pluralist polity, each with its view of the good life and its notions of 
justice and truth. The polity is only possible, however, because the adherents of a comprehensive 
doctrine exercise restraint, not insisting on their view of the true and the good, but willing to accept the 
content of the overlapping consensus between the reasonable doctrines as a basis for regulating the 
common life (Rawls 1999, 172). Citizens who endorse a reasonable judgment in the overlapping 
consensus will hold it to be true or right on the basis of their comprehensive doctrine. It is important to 
note that the overlapping consensus is not assumed to be secular. It is neither religious nor secular, but 
is capable of being accepted by proponents of both religious and secular comprehensive doctrines 
(Rawls 1999, 143). Rawls insists therefore that secularism is not the neutral ground for the meeting of 
different faiths, but is itself a possible comprehensive doctrine which might sustain the overlapping 
consensus.  
Rawls admits many possible political conceptions of justice and also many forms of public reason. His 
own proposal, ‘justice as fairness’, is one candidate among others. Rawls also includes within the family 
of possible political conceptions ‘Catholic views of the common good and solidarity when they are 
expressed in terms of political values’ (Rawls 1999, 141f.). He also includes Habermas’s discourse 
conception of legitimacy. Acceptable political conceptions of justice propose principles which apply to 
the basic structure of society, which can be presented independent of any comprehensive doctrine, and 
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which are grounded in such fundamental ideas as the freedom and equality of citizens and the idea of 
society as a fair system of cooperation. Far from excluding religious considerations, Rawls allows them 
to be part of political debate, with the proviso that if any policy or legal measure is being advocated that 
the appropriate public reasons be provided also, possibly at some later date (Rawls 1999, 143f.) 
Religious reasons are not being excluded; but only those religious reasons may be advanced in support 
of political proposals which are capable of being translated into public reasons in the strict sense. 
Rawls’s discussion of public reason suggests that religious arguments do not have to remain confined to 
the non-public realms of civil society. Believers, speaking from their faith convictions, do not have to be 
on the defensive within liberal political communities. However, the condition under which their 
contribution is welcome is that citizens of faith continue to abide by reasonable norms of argument and 
reasonable standards of participation in public discourse.  
The advantages of this model are notable in that the distinctiveness of politics is preserved, the narrow 
sense of public reason is protected, and the use of coercive force is limited and controlled. At the same 
time, the background culture of civil society as so conceived provides the private sphere in which the 
diversity of religious cultures can be tolerated. However, religion is not confined to the private domain, 
but its contribution to political discourse is welcomed both within the political culture broadly 
conceived, and also within public reason in the narrow sense. This model can accommodate the kinds of 
questions which religiously committed citizens might wish to raise in dialogue with fellow citizens. Such 
questions can be asked and pursued rigorously in the wide public political culture, without thereby 
intending to impose on fellow citizens answers, or more specifically, constitutional arrangements and 
coercive laws derived exclusively from those answers.  
Conclusion 
Two of the five models are rooted in theological world-views, namely, those associated with Augustine 
and Aquinas. Common to both is a recognition of the need to limit the claims of religion so as to allow 
the proper sphere for the political. Aquinas does it with more of a positive regard for the secular 
domain. Both of them challenge theological accounts which would claim to have the overriding say on 
the purpose of human law and rule, Augustine facing down the pagan cosmological views, as well as the 
Christian interpreters of the fall of Rome, Aquinas denying the pious and centralizing claims of King Louis 
and the Emperor Frederick. The Churchmen appear in defence of the secular, over against other 
theological voices. 
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There are significant advantages of both the private-public distinction and the concept of civil society as 
locus for Church involvement in public life. Both secure recognized space for religion, but both tend to 
exclude religion from the specifically political arena, and that is a disadvantage. The private/public 
model effectively silences any distinctively religious voice in the sphere of politics. The civil society 
model risks confining the religious contribution to a restricted area of public life, one which is possibly in 
tension with religion’s own aspirations. Rawls’s late model which includes the idea of public reason in 
the narrow sense preserves something of value from the private-public distinction. It also incorporates a 
concept of civil society with its background culture, so that it can carry forward whatever is of use in the 
civil society model. Rawls’s model goes beyond the other two in providing a place for the religious 
contribution to public life. The notion of the broad sense of public political culture releases religion from 
any confinement to the private, or to civil society as the background culture. It is thereby recognised as 
capable of making a contribution to public political life beyond a merely narrow or sectional interest, but 
potentially of relevance to the whole political sphere. Rawls’s later thought is very accommodating and 
respectful of religion, while limiting religion at the same time. His views facilitate a contribution to public 
discourse on the basis of religious commitments, while setting standards to which religious contributors 
must adhere. Those standards, however, are not such as to deprive religion of its voice in public life. 
What Rawls contributes from a political philosophical standpoint, complements what Aquinas 
contributes from a theological standpoint. Aquinas, writing from a theological perspective, respects the 
autonomy of the political. At the same time he provides reasons for restricting religious authorities or 
political leaders who claim to speak with religious authority. Rawls, writing from a political philosophical 
perspective, respects the autonomy of religion. He provides a view of public reason in the narrow sense 
whereby it is confined within definite parameters as to persons, content and context. There is a further 
complementarity between these two models. Rawls himself has acknowledged the usefulness of the 
language of the common good. The common good / public good distinction which Finnis finds in Aquinas 
parallels and is complementary to the distinction of reasonable comprehensive doctrines / overlapping 
consensus in Rawls. 
 
III 
In that earlier discussion I preferred Aquinas’s model of the common good and found it could be 
complemented by Rawls’s distinctions. However, I now wish to return to Augustine in the hope of 
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finding a more theological answer to my fundamental question. I am encouraged to do so by Brian T. 
Trainor’s articles (2010; 2015) in which he argues for a re-reading of Augustine. As noted, Augustine had 
set a very high standard with his remark about justice and the importance of rendering to God what is 
due to God. He himself was unhappy to end his reflections at his point, since he could not completely 
accept their implications. He did not shy away from facing them, however. He faced the conclusion that 
if Cicero’s definition be accepted that the city or political entity consists of a multitude of reasonable 
beings united in the agreement on what is required by justice and the common good, then the Roman 
Republic and the Roman Empire never was such a political entity. The reason being that Rome never 
gave to God the submission due to Him, but worshipped idols and conducted its public life in violent 
conquest and conflict, contrary to God’s command. As a former teacher of rhetoric in the Roman world 
Augustine appreciated how shocking such a conclusion must be. He offered a way out by proposing to 
apply another definition, also rooted in Roman literature, which would allow him to make his critical 
case while at the same time preserving something of the respectability of Rome. 
As noted already, his strategy was to focus on the definition of the city as a multitude of reasonable 
beings united in love of the same object. With this definition he could distinguish between the City of 
God as the community of those who love God and are thereby united, and the earthly city as the 
community of those whose love is of themselves. This latter form of love while shared does not in fact 
foster unity, but leads to dissension and division. Contrasting the two forms of love Augustine can 
highlight the worthiness of one city while exposing the flaws and shortcomings of the other. But this 
latter critique does not require a dismissal of Rome’s entitlement to qualify as a political entity in the 
first place. 
The question which arises for commentators on Augustine is whether or not the change of definition 
requires him to abandon the emphasis on justice as a defining element of a city. Oliver O’Donovan 
classifies the reactions as either ‘idealist’ or ‘realist’. Idealists want to stress that Augustine continues to 
hold the view that the true republic to be just must be Christian, or at least monotheistic, and 
committed to serving and implementing the Will of God. A commonwealth united in love of its preferred 
objects would be a city only in name or appearance, not in reality. Realists, on the other hand, according 
to O’Donovan, see in Augustine’s shift of emphasis an anticipation of the later modern understanding of 
the liberal polity as accommodating diverse comprehensive doctrines and welcome it accordingly 
(O’Donovan 2004, 55f.). Trainor takes a typically Catholic ‘both-and’ stance, recognizing the novelty of 
the shift to a more open definition, without assuming the other understanding was abandoned. His task 
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then is to explain how the two conceptions, idealist and realist, can be combined in a coherent 
understanding of the political entity. He attempts this by presenting Augustine’s thought in such a way 
that the different distinctions and their coherence emerge (Trainor 2010, 547). 
For Augustine, a well-ordered city is one in which God’s will is observed and the divinely intended order 
prevails. However, even for a city which would want to achieve this ideal, it is not possible within history 
given the condition of human fallenness and sin. It will be achieved in the Parousia, beyond history. But 
within history there are different kinds of city, those which strive in various degrees to be well-ordered 
in the sense of giving each including God his due, and those which turn their backs on God. Trainor uses 
the convenient images of ‘facing towards’ and ‘facing away from’. The cities which deliberately face 
away from God he suggests are not on the scale of best-better-good-poor, but are ‘to be characterised 
as unjust/unrighteous, as beyond the sphere of the truly ethical/just, rather than as inadequate in light 
of the ideal’. 
‘Augustine then does not present us with a new definition of the commonwealth that replaces 
an understanding of the commonwealth in terms of mutual consent to right (ius), but presents 
us rather with a new way of characterising a society that (i) does not serve the one true God, (ii) 
worships false gods, (iii) has no understanding or respect for the right (ius) that flows from its 
divine source and which alone constitutes a true commonwealth but that (iv) nevertheless 
continues to function and to be a society in some sense, even if it has only a bastardised form of 
existence’ (Trainor 2010, 548). 
Functioning as a society in some sense means that believers can nonetheless appreciate the measure of 
peace which is secured by that society. This sustains a space in which individuals and households (a 
private space?) can pursue their life of faith.  
On Trainor’s reading of Augustine it is helpful to make explicit two sub-distinctions implicit in the 
argument of The City of God following the basic distinction between the two cities, The City of God and 
the earthly city. The first is the distinction between the City of God as it is in itself, and as it is in the form 
of Church, empirically, within history. The second is the distinction between the earthly city as God 
oriented, as receptive to God; and the earthly city as God denying, opposed to the true God and his city. 
This allows him to argue that the true earthly city is the heavenly directed one, and the only one which 
can be considered just and in accord with the will of God. 
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With this complexity, then, we are not dealing simply with a two-term pair of ‘religious’ and ‘secular’, 
and this was an over-simplification of my earlier treatment of Augustine in the classification of positions 
on religion and politics summarized above. The secular for Augustine is not a univocal category but 
comprises a range of stances which may be distinguished between those that are facing towards God, 
and those that are facing away from him. Among those facing towards God are a great range of 
specimens depending on how well they incorporate values and virtues. But as pilgrims or wayfarers they 
recognize their condition as in progress towards an end, which may only be inchoately and vaguely 
known. To my delight Trainor uses the term ‘heuristic’ in this context without elaborating on it. But 
insofar as the common good is that end striven for (which may be understood as God as the highest 
good, or as The Good, simply, or as the human fulfilment of each and of all persons), it might be named 
but will not be fully comprehended (Riordan 2008a). All these forms of regime which face God realise 
justice in some degree, but within history and given human sinfulness their realisation will be always 
incomplete. ‘Either the soul is turned towards God, in which case it can be just to some degree, or it is 
turned away from God, in which case it cannot be just at all…’ (Trainor 2015, 375). Their achievement of 
justice will always be restricted, relative to the justice of the City of God. But even so, they can be 
understood in terms of both definitions offered, as a multitude united in a common view of what is just, 
and a community united in love of some good. In proportion as the good loved is superior or inferior in 
the hierarchy of good, so will the corresponding community be better or worse. ‘The best city is erected 
and safeguarded on the bond of faith and an unbreakable concord. This happens when the common 
good is loved, when God is the highest and truest good, and when men love each other most sincerely 
because they love themselves for sake of Him…’ (Trainor 2015, 375). It may seem strange to refer to 
such a good city as secular, since it appears to incorporate many religious elements, in the recognition of 
God as ultimate source of good, for instance. But secular is not distinguished from religious, necessarily, 
in Trainor’s reading of Augustine. He is attempting to explain how Augustine’s two definitions of ‘city’ 
might be compatible and jointly applicable to some cities in history, but not to all. That the members of 
the city are united in their pursuit of temporal and earthly goods (peace, justice, material wellbeing) 
does not preclude their being united also in doing the kind of justice which is prepared to give God what 
is due to God.  
Some political communities are turned away from God, and they too can be labelled secular. At the 
extreme are cities whose existential orientation is away from the fullness of being, and towards the 
abyss, and non-being. The good they pursue, perhaps power, domination over others, accumulation of 
wealth without regard for the needs or wellbeing of others, occupies the position of ‘highest good’ for 
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them and so is equivalent to an idol, or false god. For such cities their injustice is absolute, in contrast to 
the relative justice of other secular cities facing the other way. This is an analytic device. It remains a 
question whether any such city could possibly exist, namely, one in which there is no redeeming good 
present, in which the natural virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance are completely 
absent. Doubtless there are and have been in history regimes in which the whole political and legal 
order is based on crime. The regimes responsible for the holocaust (Nazi Germany), the gulag (the Soviet 
Union), genocide (e.g. Rwanda) and the killing fields of Cambodia spring to mind as possible candidates.  
Many of Augustine’s commentators have wanted to read him as generalizing this form of the secular as 
applicable to all political communities in history. Hence they have seen in him an anticipation of the 
stance of Thomas Hobbes and more recent liberal thinkers. In their cases the label ‘secular’ is to be 
understood, Trainor notes, as meaning ‘only secular’, or ‘secular against the sacred’, or ‘intrinsically 
secular’. But this reduction is false to Augustine’s texts and his understanding of the city in history. 
Trainor’s point is summarized in the slogan ‘sacred reign – secular rule’. Where the political authorities 
know themselves to be subordinate to higher standards that they do not set themselves then they 
acknowledge the limitations of their sovereignty. These standards are operative in citizens’ expectations 
that their governments and legislatures will make and apply laws and edicts that deliver justice and 
serve the common good. The exercise of rule in the presence of higher claims does not mean the 
enactment of revealed prescriptions from Sacred Scripture, but the exercise of political responsibility in 
the consciousness of serving a higher goal ultimately. Trainor makes the point by contrasting his view of 
the Augustinian secular state with a Theocratic state. Where the Augustinian regime is summarized as 
‘sacred reign – secular rule’, the theocratic state is summarized as ‘sacred reign – sacred rule’. The 
possible inclusion of religiously sourced law in the law of the state would be decided solely by the 
secular authorities in an Augustinian earthly city, while in a theocratic state the religious authorities 
would decide. It is not difficult to imagine examples. For instance, religiously motivated groups 
campaigned for the recognition of conscientious objection to military service in the United States of 
America, and in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. The legislators in these jurisdictions adopted the 
principle of religiously motivated conscientious objection, and eventually expanded the category. Their 
reasoning was based on the respect for the principle of individual liberty, and the desire that no one 
should be forced against his will to undertake what s/he held to be morally objectionable. This was very 
different from a possible incorporation in the civil law at the behest of religious authorities for religious 
reasons. Other examples might be found in the development of the principles and practices of 
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punishment. The elimination of ‘cruel and inhumane’ forms of punishment was argued for by religiously 
motivated groups (the Society of Friends – Quakers – have always been interested in reforming the 
practice of punishment). Religious conceptions of reconciliation may have inspired the development of 
practices of restorative justice. But the decisions by lawmakers to adopt forms of restorative justice and 
to ensure humane treatment of those punished were made for reasons perfectly accessible to non-
believers (justice, respect for human dignity, effectiveness). They were made by secular authorities, and 
not by the religious authorities for religious reasons. Yet the human, secular, reasons for the changes in 
law were such that they were open to the higher, more ultimate reality: human dignity, justice, 
solidarity of humankind, and divine mercy. 
Augustine’s thought is complex, and has suffered from the tendency to simplify in order to make it 
accessible. Trainor argues that the images and symbols used to convey Augustine’s thought, especially 
as received in the medieval period, have contributed more to confusion than to clarity. For instance, talk 
of the two princes, Priest (or Pope) and King, might be taken by some to represent the pair of City of 
God in its fullness, and the human community in history. However, Trainor notes that for Augustine 
these two can also represent the human community in history, ‘Priest’ standing for that portion of the 
City of God which is still on pilgrimage and making its way in history (the Church), and ‘King’ standing for 
the political community (Trainor 2015, 377). Insofar as the political community is secular but facing 
towards the ground of its truth and being in God, King and Priest are not opposed or warring symbols, 
but both represent in their own ways the service of the sacred. The assertion of an appropriate 
autonomy of the ‘King’ from the ‘Priest’ does not entail an assertion of absolute autonomy from the 
divine source of truth and good and social order. To be secular does not require being turned away from 
God. Trainor insists that the Augustinian view of secularity requires a ‘firm distinction in principle 
between religious law and state law. Church and state are properly distinguished and “separated” when 
it is publicly acknowledged that what aspects if any of religious law are to be enshrined in state law is a 
matter for secular authorities alone to determine’ (Trainor 2015, 381). 
There is a very similar vision of possible relationship between the sacred and the secular in The Second 
Vatican Council’s Pastoral Constitution when it speaks of the Church and the Political Community as 
possible partners in service of the same human persons but offering different but complementary 
service. ‘The political community and the Church in their respective fields are independent and 
autonomous; but under different titles they are both helping the same men to fulfil their personal and 
social vocation. The more they co-operate reasonably, with an eye on the circumstances of time and 
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place, the more effectively they will perform this service to everybody’s advantage’ (Gaudium et spes 
§76). 
Trainor argues that his reading of Augustine can be helpful in meeting the challenge formulated by 
Jürgen Habermas concerning the truth-deficit of modern secular liberal democracies. Insofar as unease 
is widely experienced in Western polities because of the lack of grounding in substantive truth, the 
Augustinian model of sacred reign – secular rule is a source of reassurance. More interesting to me is 
the argument he makes concerning the attitude of Muslims to secular modernity. For many religious 
Muslims the operative model of western liberal secularity is not attractive, seeming to foster practices 
and behaviour which violate traditional moral, cultural and religious norms. But if the secular is 
understood in an Augustinian sense, then the embracing of liberal democracy need not entail in 
principle an abandonment of religious conviction, and it offers a real and practicable alternative to a 
purely theocratic view of politics. 
Trainor’s re-reading of Augustine is challenging, requiring us move away from a simplistic conception of 
the secular as the arena opposed to the sacred. We are asked to consider the term as varied in meaning, 
since it can refer to the domain which is separated from the sacred but facing towards it and open to 
God, or it can refer to the domain which is separated from the sacred and facing away from it, opposed 
to God and closed off to the impact of the divine. The term can fluctuate in meaning, and refer to 
diverse realities along a spectrum. We should not be surprised by this, since our whole vocabulary 
exhibits the feature of analogy. Graham Ward (2000) is cited as making this point about so many of the 
important terms we use in theology which in the religious context acquire particular meaning not 
unrelated to their ordinary usages. Examples are not only ‘justice’, but also ‘community’, ‘people’, 
‘peace – salaam – shalom’, ‘virtue’ and ‘the good’ itself (Trainor 2015, 229). Another important example 
is the term ‘law’, which is capable of analogous predication from divine law, revealed law, old and new, 
natural law, canon law, civil law, moral law, and so forth (Porter 1999). Neglect of the range and of the 
reality reflected here results in the reduction to one instance which is made to be paramount and 
absolute, to the exclusion of other instances. This tendency is typical of a ‘falling’ secularity, turned away 
from God, and Trainor, citing Barth, claims to recognize it in the absolutization of one value above 
others in human rights discourse, for instance, where liberty, or sometimes equality, becomes the single 
important standard. ‘There is no uniformly practical meaning of natural law but that its meaning, intent 
and practical application is always subject to a personal or political determination that takes us in a 
particular direction or along a particular line, namely, towards or away from the City of God’ (Trainor 
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2015, 280). That determination is likely to favour individual or group interests, and so the good of a 
section is preferred to the common good. 
 
IV 
The attempt to rescue the secular and reinterpret it as not necessarily opposed to the sacred requires 
me to re-evaluate the models for understanding my dual position as believer and citizen, as living in two 
worlds. This new look at Augustine facilitated by Trainor’s studies suggests that the ‘two worlds’ 
presupposed by the question is a simplification. A more complex comprehension is needed. Being 
believer and citizen requires holding a view which encompasses four perspectives: there is the City of 
God in its completion; there is the community of believers on pilgrimage through history; there is the 
secular domain as oriented to and open to the sacred; and there is the secular domain when it is 
opposed to and turned away from the sacred. This more complex model requires of me a broader vision. 
The familiar pair of Church and State, for instance, can refer to a range of cases, depending on whether 
the State is open or closed to the transcendent, and even if open, as will be the espoused case with the 
Church, there will be gradations in the extent to which the standards of justice and truth are 
incorporated in the entities within history. 
It is understandable, then, if ‘idealist’ interpreters of Augustine are dissatisfied with the ‘realist’ 
reduction of Augustine’s thought to an anticipation of modern (Hobbesian) concerns. At the same time, 
an option for a purely ‘idealist’ interpretation would reduce the believer’s possibilities for a principled 
engagement with the reality of politics. It was not Augustine’s intention that good people would 
withdraw from the turmoil of the public arena and it is certainly not the thrust of Pope Francis’s 
engagement with important current issues such as global climate change. The model of ‘sacred reign – 
secular rule’ advocated by Brian Trainor is a valuable resource for religious believers who are called to 
serve their communities in public life, whether as citizens or as officials.  
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